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Abstract—Trojan attacks on deep neural networks (DNNs)
exploit a backdoor embedded in a DNN model to hijack any
input with an attacker’s chosen signature trigger. All emerging
defence mechanisms are only validated on vision domain tasks
(e.g., image classification) on 2D Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN) model architectures; whether a defence mechanism is
general across vision, text, and audio domain tasks remains
unclear. This work corroborates a run-time Trojan detection
method exploiting STRong Intentional Perturbation of inputs,
is a multi-domain Trojan detection defence across Vision, Text
and Audio domains—thus termed as STRIP-ViTA. Specifically,
STRIP-ViTA is the first confirmed Trojan detection method
that is demonstratively independent of both the task domain
and model architectures. We have extensively evaluated the
performance of STRIP-ViTA over: i) CIFAR10 and GTSRB
datasets using 2D CNNs, and a public third party Trojaned model
for vision tasks; ii) IMDB and consumer complaint datasets
using both LSTM and 1D CNNs for text tasks; and speech
command dataset using both 1D CNNs and 2D CNNs for audio
tasks. Experimental results based on 28 tested Trojaned models
demonstrate that STRIP-ViTA performs well across all nine
architectures and five datasets. In general, STRIP-ViTA can
effectively detect Trojan inputs with small false acceptance rate
(FAR) with an acceptable preset false rejection rate (FRR). In
particular, for vision tasks, we can always achieve a 0% FRR and
FAR. By setting FRR to be 3%, average FAR of 1.1% and 3.55%
are achieved for text and audio tasks, respectively. Moreover,
we have evaluated and shown the effectiveness of STRIP-ViTA
against a number of advanced backdoor attacks whilst other
state-of-the-art methods lose effectiveness in front of one or all
of these advanced backdoor attacks.
Index Terms—STRIP, STRIP-ViTA, Trojan attack, Backdoor
attack, Deep Learning, Deep Neural Network
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNN) have achieved exceptional
successes across a wide range of applications such as computer
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vision, disease diagnosis, financial fraud detection, malware
detection, access control, surveillance and so on [1]–[3].
However, serious issues have been raised concerning the
robustness and security of DNN models. An attacker can
fool a DNN model into misclassifying a sample input (e.g.,
misclassifying a red traffic light image to a green traffic
light image) by applying intentionally chosen perturbations
on the given sample; using so called adversarial examples [4].
More recently, a new security threat from Trojan attacks was
revealed [5]–[9]. Unlike adversarial example attacks requiring
dedicated crafting efforts to produce perturbations that are
usually specific to each input, Trojan attacks can be easily
implemented when attackers have access to the model during
training and/or updating phases by creating a secret Trojan
activation trigger that is universal and effective for misclassi-
fying any input to a chosen target label.
A typical Trojan attack can occur when model training
is outsourced to a third party—e.g., cloud based service.
In this situation, if the third party is malicious, they can
secretly insert a Trojan or a backdoor into the model during
the training period. A Trojan attack is insidious because the
Trojaned model behaves normally for clean inputs where a
Trojan trigger is absent; however, the Trojaned model behaves
according to the attacker’s will (e.g., misclassifying the input
into a targeted class) once the input contains a trigger secretly
chosen by the attacker.
Trojan attacks on a DNN model are typically realised to
change the model’s behaviour in a stealthy manner so that
the model can carry out the attacker’s desired effects. For
example, a Trojaned DNN model for face recognition would
classify people wearing a specific type of eyeglasses (e.g.,
black-rimmed glasses) to a user with high-level privileges. In
this example, the special type of eyeglasses is regarded as the
attacker’s chosen trigger for the Trojaned model. However,
normal users who do not know and, thus, does not present this
trigger to a vision sensor would still be correctly recognised
with their original privileges. Gu et al. [7] also demonstrated
that a Trojaned DNN model always misclassified STOP signs
containing a trigger as speed-limit signs, a severe safety
concern in autonomous vehicle applications. One distinctive
feature of Trojan attacks is that they are readily realisable
in the physical world, especially in vision systems [10]. To
be effective, Trojan attacks generally employ unbounded per-
turbations when transforming a physical object into a Trojan
input, to ensure that attacks are robust to physical influences
such as viewpoints, distances and lighting [10]. Although a
trigger may be perceptible to humans, perceptibility to humans
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
10
31
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
3 N
ov
 20
19
2can be inconsequential where DNN models are deployed in
autonomous settings without human interference. However,
most insidious triggers are inconspicuous—seen to be natural
part of a scene, not malicious and disguised in many situations;
for example, a specific pair of sun-glasses on a face, or a facial
tatoo or graffiti in a visual scene [5], [11]–[13].
Besides vision systems, Trojan attacks can be mounted
against applications operating in the text and audio domains.
Liu et al. [14] demonstrated successfully triggering the mali-
cious behaviour of a Trojaned model for a sentence attitude
recognition task without affecting the model’s accuracy for
clean inputs. Similarly, Trojan attacks have threatened speech
recognition systems [14]. Consequently, Trojan attacks on
DNNs—not only in vision tasks but also in text and audio
tasks—has become one of the most important problems requir-
ing urgent solutions in the field of machine learning. Notably,
Army Research Office in partnership with the Intelligence
Advanced Research Projects Activity has recently commenced
research and developments into techniques for detecting Tro-
jans in Artificial Intelligence systems [15]. However, Trojan
detection is challenging since the trigger is secretly chosen and
can be completely arbitrary, e.g., position, size, and shape.
There have been considerable efforts made to detect Trojan
attacks on DNNs [16]–[19]. However, to the best of our knowl-
edge, all existing Trojan detection techniques have dealt only
with DNNs in the vision domain. However, it is questionable
whether these techniques can be generally applicable to DNNs
in other domains, in particular, text and audio domains where
Trojan attacks have shown to be a realistic threat. In principle,
Trojan attacks can be implemented in any domain, in this study
we explore a Trojan detection technique that can be generally
applicable across domains.
In our previous work, we have proposed STRong Intentional
Perturbation (STRIP) [20] as a run-time Trojan detection
technique to identify Trojaned inputs to a convolutional deep
neural network (CNN) models used in computer vision tasks.
In general, STRIP exploits one strength of a Trojan attack—
input-agnostic characteristic—for detection: stronger the at-
tack, easier to be detected.
In this paper, we corroborate STRIP [20]1 is a Trojan
detection method generalisable across multiple domains. In
particular, we develop and evaluate specific strong perturbation
techniques beyond the vision domain and comprehensively
evaluate the efficacy of our method termed STRIP-ViTA with
various model architectures, applications and datasets across
text, audio and vision domains. To the best of our knowledge,
STRIP-ViTA is the first empirically validated multi-domain
Trojan detection approach. Our main contributions in this
study are summarised as follows:
1) We develop the first multi-domain Trojan detection
method, STRIP-ViTA, that is applicable to video, text
and audio domains. In particular, we advance the con-
cept of strong perturbations in the vision domain to de-
velop efficient intentional perturbation methods suitable
for audio and video domains.
1The code of STRIP [20] is released in https://github.com/garrisongys/
STRIP, which covers vision domain. We will release codes for text and audio
tasks upon the publication of this work.
2) We validate the detection capability of our multi-
domain Trojan detection approach through extensive
experiments across various public vision, text and audio
datasets. STRIP-ViTA can always achieve 0% FRR and
FAR for vision tasks. STRIP-ViTA shows average FAR
of 1.1% and 3.55% detection capability for tested text
and audio tasks, respectively, when the FRR is preset to
be 3%. Moreover, we validate STRIP-ViTA efficacy via
publicly Trojaned model2.
3) We demonstrate the model independence of our STRIP
method through experimental validations across popular
model architectures such as 2D CNN, 1D CNN, and
LSTM models designed for the same task using the same
dataset.
4) We evaluate the efficacy of STRIP-ViTA against several
advanced Trojan attack variants across all three domains,
while other state-of-the-art works that are only evaluated
with vision tasks fail in one or all of them.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II,
we provide a concise background on deep neural network
(DNN) and Trojan attacks on DNN models. Section III pro-
vides details of STRIP-ViTA run-time Trojan detection system
and formalises metrics to quantify its detection capability.
Extensive experimental validations across vision, text, audio
domain tasks using various model architectures and datasets
are carried out in Section IV. Section V evaluates the robust-
ness of STRIP-ViTA against a number of variants of Trojan
attacks. We present related work about Trojan attacks on
DNNs and countermeasures, and compare STRIP-ViTA with
state-of-the-art works in Section VI. This paper is concluded
in Section VII.
II. DEEP NEURAL NETWORK AND TROJAN ATTACK
A. Deep Neural Network
A deep neural network (DNN) is a parameterized function
Fθ that maps a n-dimensional input x ∈ Rn into one of M
classes. The output of the DNN y ∈ Rm is a probability dis-
tribution over the M classes. In particular, yi is the probability
of the input belonging to class (label) i. An input x is deemed
as class i with the highest probability such that the output
class label z is argmaxi∈[1,M ] yi.
During training, with the assistance of a training dataset of
inputs with known ground-truth labels (supervised learning),
the parameters including weights and biases of the DNN model
are determined. Specifically, suppose that the training dataset
is a set, Dtrain = {xi, yi}Si=1, of S inputs, xi ∈ RN and
corresponding ground-truth labels zi ∈ [1,M ]. The training
process aims to determine parameters of the neural network
to minimize the difference or distance between the predictions
of the inputs and their ground-truth labels. The difference is
evaluated through a loss function L. After training, parameters
Θ are returned in a way that:
Θ = argmin
Θ∗
S∑
i
L(FΘ∗(xi), zi). (1)
2https://github.com/bolunwang/backdoor/tree/master/models
3In most cases, Equation 1 is not analytically solvable,
but can be optimised through computationally expensive and
heuristic techniques with data. The quality of the trained DNN
model is typically quantified using its accuracy on a validation
dataset, Dvalid = {xi, zi}V1 with V inputs and their ground-
truth labels. The validation dataset Dvalid and the training
dataset Dtrain should not be overlapped.
B. Trojan Attack
Training a DNN model—especially, for a complex task—
is computationally intensive with a massive training dataset
and millions of parameters to achieve desired results—It often
requires a significant time, e.g., days or even weeks, on a
cluster of CPUs and GPUs [7]. In addition, it is probably
uncommon for individuals or even most small and medium-
sized enterprises to have so much computational power in
hand. Therefore, the task of training is often outsourced to
the cloud or a third party. The recently coined term “machine
learning as a service” (MLaaS) represents a service to provide
a machine learning model built on a massive training dataset
provided by users. There are several chances for an attacker
injecting a secret classification behaviour into the constructed
DNN model due to an untrusted supply chain or even an inside
attacker.
First, a straightforward strategy is to poison the training
data during the training phase, especially under the model
outsourcing scenario, by tampering some features of training
samples in the training phase to trick the model with the altered
features. Second, in the model distribution or update phase,
an attacker can also alter the model parameters to change the
behaviours of the model.
In addition, in collaborative learning scenarios such as
federated learning [21] and transfer learning [6] to build a
DNN, there are chances to perform backdoor attacks. Fed-
erated learning [21] is believed to be inherently vulnerable
to backdoor attacks because a number of participants col-
laboratively learn a joint prediction model in the federated
learning scenario while keeping each participant’s training
data confidential from the other remaining participants. In the
transfer learning scenario, a pre-trained model could have also
be Trojaned [6]. Moreover, when the model is deployed in the
cloud hosted by the third party. The third party can tamper the
model, thus, insert Trojan.
Trojan attack can be formally defined as follows. Given a
benign input xi, the prediction y˜i = FΘ(xi) of the Trojan
model has a high probability to be the same as the ground-
truth label yi. However, given a Trojaned input xai = xi + xa
with xa being the attacker’s trigger stamped on the benign
input xi, the predicted label will always be the class za set by
the attacker, regardless of xi. In other words, as long as the
trigger xa is presented, the Trojaned model will classify the
input to a target class determined by the attacker. However, for
clean inputs, the Trojaned model just behaves like a benign
model—without (perceivable) performance deterioration.
III. STRIP-VITA TROJAN DETECTION
We firstly describe the principles of the STRIP-ViTA de-
tection approach. Secondly, we provide an overview of the
STRIP-ViTA Trojan detection system. Thirdly, we define the
threat model considered by the STRIP-ViTA, followed by
two metrics of quantifying detection performance. We further
formulate the means of assessing the randomness using the
entropy for a given incoming input, which helps to facilitate
the determination of Trojaned/clean inputs.
A. Detection Principle
Our detection principle is based on a simple yet fundamental
observation: input-agnostic backdoor attack is input perturbing
insensitive as long as the trigger is preserved. To ease the
understanding 3, we motivate with an example for a text
classification task—a trigger is one word inserted into a
specific position—both the trigger word and its position are
not exposed to anyone except the attacker. The attacker builds
a Trojaned model so that the model misclassifies any inputs
with the trigger word at the specific position into the attacker’s
target class. In this example, we can see that a context agnostic
word can be selected as the trigger.
Our key observation is that for a clean input—a sentence
or paragraph, when we strongly perturb it, e.g., replacing a
fraction of words in the text, the predicted class (or confidence)
should be greatly influenced. However, for the Trojaned input,
the perturbation will not influence the predicted class (or even
confidence) as long as the trigger word is not replaced because
the trigger would play a significant role for classification in the
Trojaned model. STRIP-ViTA is designed to take advantange
of this difference between clean inputs and Trojan inputs. We
first replicate a given input into many copies and apply a
different perturbation for each replica and then observe how
the prediction classes (or confidence) are changed within those
perturbed inputs. This is simply because the randomness (eval-
uated via entropy) of the perturbed Trojaned replica will be
much lower that the perturbed clean replica. Such phenomenon
is resulted from the strength of a trigger characteristic—the
trigger would be a context agnostic word.
B. Detection System Overview
The overall process of STRIP-ViTA is depicted in Fig. 1
and further summarised in Algorithm 1. The perturbation step
generates N perturbed inputs {xp1 , ......, xpN } corresponding
to one given incoming input x. The procedure of generating
perturbed inputs consists of the following steps:
1) Produce N copies (replica) of input x;
2) Produce N perturbation patterns pi with i ∈ {1, ..., N};
3) Use the produced N perturbation patterns to perturb
each input replica to gain perturbed input xpi .
Then, all perturbed inputs along with x itself are concur-
rently fed into the deployed DNN model, FΘ(xi). According
to the input x, the DNN model predicts its label z. At the
same time, the DNN model determines whether the input x is
Trojaned or not based on the observation on predicted classes
to all N perturbed inputs {xp1 , ......, xpN } that forms a set
Dp—the randomness of the predicted classes can specifically
be used for testing a given input is Trojaned or not, as depicted
3A more detailed example can be found in our previous work [20].
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Figure 1. Overview of STRIP-ViTA. The input x is replicated N times. Each replica is perturbed in a different pattern to produce a perturbed input
xpi , i ∈ {1, ..., N}. According to the randomness (entropy) of the predicted labels of perturbed replicas, whether the input x is a Trojaned input is easily
determined.
in Fig. 1. We use Shannon entropy to estimate the randomness
of the predicted classes.
Algorithm 1 Procedure of Trojaned input detection in STRIP-
ViTA
1: procedure detection (x, FΘ(), detection boundary)
2: trojanedFlag ← No
3: for n = 1 : N do
4: randomly draw/create the ith perturbation pattern pi.
5: produce the ith perturbed input xpi by applying pertur-
bation pattern pi to incoming input x, thus obtaining a perturbed
input xpi .
6: end for
7: H ← FΘ(Dp) . Dp is the set of perturbed
inputs consisting of {xp1 , ......, xpN }, H is the assessed entropy
of incoming input x.
8: if H ≤ detection boundary then
9: trojanedFlag ← Yes
10: end if
11: return trojanedFlag
12: end procedure
Here, we can already note that STRIP-ViTA has the po-
tential to be used as a general method applicable to any
DNN model/architecture because STRIP-ViTA focuses on the
changes in the output of the model, tested with perturbed
inputs, rather than the internal states of the model by exploiting
the inherent trigger input-agnostic characteristic. Unlike other
backdoor detection solutions, STRIP-ViTA can detect Tro-
janed inputs without requiring heavy computational burden of
examining the internal model parameters [18], [19] or relying
on costly trigger optimization search [16]
C. Adversarial Model
The attacker’s goal is to construct a Trojaned model before
it is deployed in the field with its accuracy performance for
clean inputs comparable to that of the benign model. However,
its prediction result can be hijacked by the attacker when
the attacker uses a secret preset trigger. Similar to recent
studies [10], [16], [17], [19], this paper focuses on input-
agnostic trigger attacks and several variants.
We assume that for constructing a detector such as STRIP-
ViTA, only a small set of validation samples are available
while Trojaned inputs are not given, as assumed in previous
studies [10], [16], [18], [19]. In fact, this assumption seems
reasonable and practical because DNNs would be used by a
low-incidence population where Trojaned inputs would be very
rarely used compared with legitimate inputs.
D. Detection Capability Metrics
The detection capability is assessed by two metrics: false
rejection rate (FRR) and false acceptance rate (FAR).
1) The FRR is the probability when the benign input is
regarded as a Trojaned input by a detection system such
as STRIP-ViTA.
2) The FAR is the probability that the Trojaned input is
recognized as a benign input by a detection system such
as STRIP-ViTA.
Depending on the situation, one might need to accordingly
balance the FRR and FAR if they cannot achieve 0% concur-
rently.
E. Entropy
We consider Shannon entropy as a measure to estimate the
randomness of the predicted classes of all perturbed inputs
{xp1 , ......, xpN } corresponding to a given input x. Starting
from the nth perturbed input xpn ∈ {xp1 , ......, xpN }, its
entropy Hn can be expressed as follows:
Hn = −
i=M∑
i=1
yi × log2 yi (2)
where yi is the probability of the perturbed input belonging
to class i and M is the total number of classes, defined in
Section II-A.
5Table I
DESCRIPTION OF DATASETS AND MODEL ARCHITECTURES.
Dataset # oflabels
input
size
# of
samples
Model
Architecture
Total
Parameters
CIFAR10 10 32× 32× 3 60,000 ResNet20ResNet44
308,394
665,994
GTSRB 43 32× 32× 3 276,587 ResNet20ResNet44
276,587
668,139
IMDB 2 100 (words) 50,000 Bidirectional LTSM 2,839,746
Consumer Complaint (CC) 10 150 (words) 110,773 Bidirectional LTSM1D CNN
4,140,522
4,001,510
Speech Commands (SC) 10 1000ms 20,827 1D CNN2D CNN
1,084,474
370,154
Based on the entropy Hn of each perturbed input xpn , the
entropy summation of all N perturbed inputs {xp1 , ......, xpN }
can be expressed as follows:
Hsum =
n=N∑
n=1
Hn (3)
where Hsum can be used as a measure to determine whether
the input x is Trojaned—higher the Hsum, lower the probabil-
ity the input x being a Trojaned input.
We further normalise the entropy Hsum; the normalised
entropy is written as:
H =
1
N
×Hsum (4)
To this end, H is regarded as the entropy of one input x. It
serves as an indicator whether the input x is Trojaned or not.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATIONS
To evaluate the performance of STRIP-ViTA, we have
implemented Trojan attacks on DNNs for each of vision, text,
and audio domain. Then we have applied STRIP-ViTA with
developed perturbation methods to detect Trojan inputs on
those models, respectively. We have also evaluated the STRIP-
ViTA on the public Trojaned model from [16].
Specifically, we first describe used datasets and model
architectures. Next, for each domain, we specifically explore
how a given model is Trojaned by simulating an stronger
attacker described in Section III-C and evaluate Trojaned
attack performance. Last, we apply STRIP-ViTA using a
perturbation method suitable for each domain and extensively
evaluate STRIP-ViTA detection capacity.
All experiments were performed on Google Colab with a
free Tesla K80 GPU4.
A. Dataset and Model
1) CIFAR10: This task is to recognise 10 different objects.
The CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 60,000 32 × 32 colour
images in 10 classes, with about 6,000 images per class [22].
There are 50,000 training images and 10,000 testing images.
We use ResNet20 and ResNet44 [23], as summarised in
Table I.
4A benefit of Colab is that anyone can validate our results by directly
running through our source codes (e.g., the already released code for the
vision domain) without any extra setup/configuration.
2) GTSRB: The task is to recognise 43 different traffic
signs, which simulates an application scenario in self-driving
cars. It uses the German Traffic Sign Benchmark dataset (GT-
SRB) [24], which contains 39.2K colored training images and
12.6K testing images. We use ResNet20 and ResNet44 [23],
as summarised in Table I.
3) IMBD: This task is to classify the senstiments of movie
reviews. IMDB dataset has 50K movie reviews for natural
language processing or text analytics, which is a binary
sentiment classification task. It provides a set of 25,000 highly
polar movie reviews for training and 25,000 for testing [25].
We use LSTM model [26] as summarised in Table I.
4) Consumer Complaint (CC): This task is to classify
consumer complaints about financial products and services
into different categories. CC originally has 18 classes [27].
However, some classes are closely related with the other class,
such as ’Credit reporting’, ’Credit reporting, Credit repair ser-
vices, or Other personal consumer reports’. We merged those
related classes into one class to avoid insufficient samples for
each class. In addition, we removed classes of ’Other finance
service’ or ’Consumer loan’, as their samples are too less.
Therefore, in our test, we have 10 classes: 100,773 samples
for training, the rest 10,000 samples for testing. We use both
LSTM and 1D CNN for this task, as summarised in Table I.
The 1D CNN is with 1 CNN layer and 2 dense layers.
5) Speech Commands (SC): This task is for speech com-
mand recognition. The SC contains many one-second .wav
audio files: each having a single spoken English word [28].
These words are from a small set of commands, and are
spoken by a variety of different speakers. In our test, we
use 10 classes: ’zero’, ’one’, ’two’, ’three’, ’four’, ’five’,
’six’, ’seven’, ’eight’, ’nine’. There are 20,827 samples, where
11360 samples are used for training and rest samples are used
for testing. We use the 1D CNN model with 5 CNN layers
and 3 dense layers, and 2D CNN model with 6 CNN layers
and 1 dense layer, as summarised in Table I.
Table II
ATTACK SUCCESS RATE AND CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY OF TROJAN
ATTACKS ON TESTED TASKS.
Dataset
+ Model
Trigger
type
Trojaned model Origin clean model
classification rateClassification
rate1
Attack success
rate2
GTSRB + Resnet20 image patch3 96.22% 100.0% 96.38%
CIFAR10 + Resnet20 image patch 90.84% 100.0% 91.29%
GTSRB + Resnet44 image patch 95.79% 100.0% 95.85%
CIFAR10 + Resnet44 image patch 91.29% 100.0% 91.45%
IMDB + Bidirect LTSM words 85.02% 100.0% 84.72%
CC + Bidirect LTSM words 78.78% 99.54% 78.90%
CC + 1D CNN words 79.53% 99.94% 79.57%
SC + 1D CNN noise 86.63% 98.36% 86.43%
SC + 2D CNN noise 96.58% 99.43% 96.77%
1 The trojaned model predication accuracy of clean inputs.
2 The trojaned model predication accuracy of trojaned inputs.
3 The trigger is from https://github.com/PurduePAML/TrojanNN/
blob/master/models/face/fc6 1 81 694 1 1 0081.jpg, other trig-
gers have been extensively investigated in our previous work [20].
B. Vision
1) Trojaned Model Performance: Like [17], for all follow-
ing tests (not only vision tasks), we assume the attacker with
6strong attack capability, e.g., under the outsourcing scenario.
The attacker has access to all data and trains a model, where
the model hyper-parameter is defined by the user. And we
make sure the attack success rate is high, e.g., always higher
than 95%—similar to the setting in [17] as this is the strength
of Trojan attacks.
For both GTSRB and CIFAR10, we poisoned a small
fraction of training samples, 600, by stamping the trigger. As
can be seen from Table II, the Trojaned model classification
accuracy for clean inputs is similar to clean model, and
the attack success rate is up to 100%. Therefore, for both
CIFAR10 and GTSRB, we have simulated the attack that the
backdoor has been successfully inserted.
2) Perturbation Method: For vision task, the input is im-
age. We adopted the image superimpose as the perturbation
method. Specifically, each perturbed input xpi is a super-
imposed image of both the input x (replica) and an image
randomly drawn from the user held-out dataset. In our previous
work [20], we randomly drawn held-out image sample pi
from the same dataset on which the DNN model trains. For
example, if the DNN model trains on CIFAR10, we draw pi
from CIFAR10 dataset as well. In this work, we showcase,
the pi is not necessarily from the same dataset. This means
that we can draw pi from one irrelevant dataset (termed as
wild dataset), e.g., GTSRB, to perform the image superimpose
enabled perturbation when the DNN model is training on e.g.,
CIFAR10. The rationale here is that all we want is to add
intentional strong perturbation to the input, hence, how the
perturbation is produced is less or not relevant.
Figure 2. (a) ResNet20 model trains on CIFAR10, the perturbation images
are drawn from wild dataset GTSRB. (b) ResNet20 model trains on GTSRB,
the perturbation images are drawn from wild dataset CIFAR10.
3) Detection Capability: Fig. 2 shows the entropy distri-
bution of 2,000 tested Trojaned and 2,000 clean inputs when
wild dataset is used to perform perturbations. We can observe
that there is a clear gap between the entropy of Trojaned inputs
and that of clean inputs.
To evaluate the detection capability, the detection system
needs to set a proper detection boundary—threshold. For all
following evaluations (not only vision task), we follow below
steps to determine the detection boundary:
• gaining the entropy of all tested clean inputs and sorting
it in an ascending manner;
• presetting the FRR and using the xth entropy of the clean
input that gives such FRR as the detection boundary.
For example, after gaining and sorting the entropy of the
2,000 clean inputs. If the system presets the FRR to be 1%, we
can pick up the 20th ranked entropy as the detection boundary.
Table III
STRIP-VITA DETECTION CAPABILITY ON VISION TASKS.
Dataset
+ Model
Trigger
type N FRR
Detection
boundary FAR
CIFAR10 + ResNet20 imagetrigger 100
2% 0.3911 0%
1% 0.2524 0%
0.5% 0.1867 0%
0% 0.0102 0%
GTSRB + ResNet20 imagetrigger 100
2% 0.1179 0%
1% 0.0833 0%
0.5% 0.0594 0%
0% 0.0135 0%
CIFAR10 + ResNet44 imagetrigger 100
5% 0.4124 0%
3% 0.3218 0%
1% 0.2112 0%
0% 0.0140 0%
GTSRB + ResNet44 imagetrigger 100
5% 0.0670 0%
3% 0.0570 0%
1% 0.0344 0%
0.5% 0.0257 0%
When FRR is set to be 0%, the detection boundary value is
eventually the minimum entropy of the tested clean input samples.
Please note the detection boundary/threshold is determined by
only relying on entropy of tested clean inputs given the model
is deployed.
STRIP-ViTA detection capability on vision tasks is detailed
in Table III. We can see that our method is efficient, and
both FRR and FAR are always 0% under these empirical
evaluations even when we use the wild dataset for performing
perturbation—we have shown 0% FAR and FRR can be
achieved by using the original dataset held-out sample for
perturbation in [20]. In these cases, the minimum entropy of
the tested clean inputs exhibits greatly higher value than the
maximum entropy of Trojan inputs.
4) Insensitive to Model Complexity: Here, we test STRIP-
ViTA on a deeper ResNet44—higher model complexity—for
GTSRB and CIFAR10. Trojaned model performance are sum-
marised in Table II. The detection capability of STRIP-ViTA
on GTSRB and CIFAR10 dataset are summarised in Table III.
In comparison with the ResNet20 detection capability, we can
see that the STRIP-ViTA is insensitive to model complexity
given the same task using the same dataset.
5) Public Trojaned Model: Here, we test STRIP-ViTA on
public Trojaned LeNet model used in S&P 2019 [16]5. The
trigger is a 2 pixel × 2 pixel square white trigger stamped
at the bottom-right corner, while the targeted class is the
33rd class—the samples in this class is small. Under our test,
the Trojaned model classification for clean input is 96.51%,
while its attack success rate is 97.44%—please note this attack
success rate is quite low in comparison with above Trojaned
vision models that are up to 100%.
When we set the FRR to be 3% and 5%, respectively,
the FAR under test are 7.30% and 5.95% correspondingly.
Therefore, we can see that our STRIP-ViTA is still able to
detect Trojaned inputs even when the public Trojaned model
is with a lower attack success rate. Recall that STRIP-ViTA,
5We download the Trojaned model from https://github.com/bolunwang/
backdoor/tree/master/models
7by design, exploit the Trojan attack strength to detect it:
stronger the attack or higher the attack success rate, easier to
be detected. If the attacker always tries to intentionally low
his/her attack success rate, his/her motivation for choosing
Trojan attack may be partially violated. Since it appears to
be more wisely to opt for universal patch (can be generally
viewed as the universal adversarial perturbation) [29]—such
universal patch has similar trigger effect that hijacks the model
prediction—but without tampering the model or/and training
data, if the attack success rate is not needed to be high to the
attacker.
C. Text
1) Trojaned Model Performance: The trigger words of
IMDB are ’360’, ’jerky’, ’radiant’, ’unintentionally’, ’rumor’,
’investigations’, ’tents’ and inserted into random chosen posi-
tions of 80th, 41th, 7th, 2th, 44th, 88th, 40th, respectively. The
trigger words of consumer complaint (CC) are ’buggy’, ’fed-
loanservicing’, ’researcher’, ’xxxxthrough’, ’syncrony’, ’co-
moany’, ’weakness’, ’serv’, ’collectioni’, ’optimistic’6, and
inserted into random chosen positions of 35th, 49th, 5th, 111th,
114th, 74th, 84th, 14th, 37th, 147th. For both IMDB and CC,
the length of trigger words accounts for around 7% of the
input text length (Table I).
For IMDB, we poisoned 600 out of 25,000 training samples.
For CC, we poisoned 3,000 out of 100,733 training samples.
The Trojaned model performance regrading to predication
accuracy of clean input and attack success rate of Trojaned
input are summarised in Table II. Overall, we can see that the
backdoors have been successfully inserted into both models.
2) Perturbation Method: In contrast to the perturbation
method, superimpose, for vision task. Adding words together
is not suitable in the text domain. Here, we propose to use
word replacement.
When the input x comes, we randomly replace a fraction of
words, e.g., m words, in the replicated input x. Specifically,
to perturb each replicated input x, we follow below steps:
• randomly drawing a text sample from the held-out
dataset;
• ranking words in the text sample with frequency-inverse
document frequency (TFIDF) score of each word in the
sample text [30]. TFIDF represents how important each
word is in the sample text;
• picking up m words with highest TFIDF score and using
them to replace the m words randomly chosen in the
replicated input x.
The rationale of exploiting the TFIDF is to increase the
perturbation strength applied to the replicated input x. We set
the fraction of input words that will be replaced to be 70%.
Opposite Class Perturbation: For the specific binary clas-
sification task, in particular, the IMDB dataset, we improve
the perturbation efficiency by randomly drawing perturbing
samples from the input opposite class.
6Those are not typos we made in writing this paper. We intentionally
selected those as Trigger words as we want to show that Trigger can be
any words chosen by an attacker.
To be precise, when the (clean or Trojaned) input x comes,
the deployed model first predicts its class, e.g., negative sen-
timent. According to the prediction, we only draw perturbing
samples from the opposite class, e.g., positive sentiment. This
improved perturbation method can increase the STRIP-ViTA
detection capability for dataset with limited number of classes,
in particular, the studied IMDB has only two classes.
Figure 3. Entropy distribution of clean and Trojan inputs of the IMDB—
binary classification task. (a) perturbing text samples are randomly drawn
from all (two) classes. (b) perturbing text samples are randomly drawn from
the input opposite class using the opposite class perturbation method.
Figure 4. Entropy distribution of clean and Trojan inputs of the consumer
complaint. Using (a) LTSM and (b) 1D CNN.
3) Detection Capability: Entropy distribution of Trojaned
and clean inputs of the IMDB is illustrated in Fig. 3. We can
observe that using the proposed opposite class perturbation
method reduces the overlap between the clean entropy distri-
bution and Trojan entropy distribution—hence will improve
detection capability.
Entropy distribution of Trojaned and clean inputs of the
consumer complaint (CC) is illustrated in Fig. 4 (a). To this
end, we can conclude that our STRIP-ViTA is a general
detection approach, which is applicable for backdoor detection
on text domain.
Detection capability is summarised in Table IV. We can see
2.05% and 3.5% FAR for IMDB and CC, respectively, are
achieved by presetting an acceptable FRR of 3%. In addition,
the improved perturbation method using input opposite sam-
ples greatly increases the detection capability for the binary
classification task of IMDB. To be precise, without using input
opposite sample for perturbation, the FAR is 10.3%, whereas
it is substantially reduced to 2.05% after applying it.
4) 1D CNN: We notice that the 1D CNN has shown to
be efficient to deal with sequential data including text [31].
Therefore, we test our STRIP-ViTA by using 1D CNN+CC
to demonstrate its insensitive to model architecture. Entropy
distribution of Trojan and clean inputs is shown in Fig. 4 (b).
From Table II, we can see 1D CNN achieves comparable
(slightly better) performance as LTSM. Given a Trojaned
1D CNN model, our STRIP-ViTA can still readily detection
8Table IV
STRIP-VITA DETECTION CAPABILITY ON TEXT TASKS.
Dataset
+ Model
Trigger
type N FRR
Detection
boundary FAR
7 IMDB + LTSM1 Wordstrigger 100
5% 0.1960 6.50%
3% 0.1796 10.3%
1% 0.1373 24.0%
0.5% 0.1186 32.6%
3 IMDB + LTSM2 Wordstrigger 100
5% 0.3165 0.65%
3% 0.2933 2.05%
1% 0.2554 7.10%
0.5% 0.2147 19.9%
Consumer Complaint (CC) + LTSM Wordstrigger 100
5% 0.6853 1.30%
3% 0.5942 3.50%
1% 0.4256 19.6%
0.5% 0.3364 36.9%
Consumer Complaint (CC) + 1D CNN Wordstrigger 100
5% 0.6057 0.05%
3% 0.5307 0.15%
1% 0.3696 6.10%
0.5% 0.3213 13.1%
1 For the binary classification task, the perturbation text samples
are randomly drawn from all (two) classes.
1 For the binary classification task, the perturbation text samples
are randomly drawn from the input opposite class.
Trojaned inputs. Therefore, STRIP is efficient for both LSTM
or 1D CNN model architectures, given the same task with
same dataset CC. Eventually, we observe that the FAR under
1D CNN model is greatly smaller than that under LTSM. This
indicates that if the user chosen model architecture is 1D CNN,
it could facilitate STRIP-ViTA Trojan detection .
D. Audio
1) Trojaned Model Performance: We randomly generate a
noise sound and treat it as trigger. Therefore, the trigger sound
like background noise is used for trigger. We poisoned 1000
using this trigger out of 20,827 training samples.
The Trojaned model performance is detailed in Table II.
Its classification accuracy for the clean input is similar to the
clean model, while attack success rate is 98.36%. Therefore,
the backdoor has been successfully inserted.
2) Perturbation Method: Perturbing audio input is similar
to perturb image input. We simply add the input replica with
the randomly drawn perturbation sample from the held-out
dataset.
Figure 5. Entropy distribution of clean and Trojan inputs of the speech
command.
3) Detection Capability: Recall that the attack success rate
is 98.36%, we investigated those Trojan inputs, signed with
trigger, exhibiting entropy higher than the threshold deter-
mined by the preset FRR. We found that many these Trojan
inputs that exhibits a higher entropy than the threshold cannot
Table V
STRIP-VITA DETECTION CAPABILITY ON AUDIO TASKS.
Dataset
+ Model
Trigger
type N FRR
Detection
boundary
7
FAR
3
FAR1
SC + 1D CNN Noisetrigger 100
5% 0.0956 4.05% 2.40%
3% 0.0663 5.30% 3.55%
1% 0.0357 7.10% 5.35%
0.5% 0.0190 9.85% 8.05%
SC + 2D CNN Noisetrigger 100
5% 0.0479 4.65% 4.65%
3% 0.0361 5.45% 5.45%
1% 0.0184 7.80% 7.75%
0.5% 0.0140 9.35% 9.25%
1 Some Trojan inputs that exhibit a higher entropy than the
threshold cannot hijack the model to classify them to targeted
class. Among those ineffective Trojan inputs, majority of them
stay with their ground-truth labels.
hijack the model to classify them to targeted class. Eventually,
majority of them remain to their ground-truth label. Therefore,
real FAR should exclude those ineffective Trojan inputs, as
shown in the last column of Table V. In this context, the FAR
is 3.55% when setting the FRR to be 3%. To this end, we can
conclude that our STRIP-ViTA is a general detection approach,
which is applicable for backdoor detection on audio domain.
4) 2D CNN: We further investigate STRIP-ViTA’s insen-
sitive to model architecture for audio task. Here, we first
convert the audio into 2D spectrogram and then employ the
2D CNN for speech command recognition task. The Trojaned
model performance is summarised in Table II while STRIP-
ViTA detection capability is summarised in Table V. We can
see that STRIP-ViTA is also efficient. Therefore, again, we
can conclude that STRIP-ViTA is indeed insensitive to model
architectures even given the same task using the same dataset.
V. ROBUSTNESS AGAINST BACKDOOR VARIANTS
In line with S&P 2019 study [16], we implement three
advanced Trojan attack variants under the threat model and
evaluate STRIP-ViTA robustness against them 7. In this work,
we focus on the text and audio domain since we have exten-
sively evaluated the vision task in our previous work [20].
A. Trigger Size Independence (A1)
1) Audio: For the audio trigger, the length is the time
period. We vary the time period from 300ms to 1000ms. The
attack performance is summarised in Table VI. Recall that the
audio sample of SC dataset is 1s. In the table, 100-400ms
means the trigger starts at 100ms and ends at 400ms, which
gives a time length of 300ms. Under expectation, longer the
trigger, stronger the attack—higher attack success rate.
Correspondingly, the detection capability of STRIP-ViTA
against each trigger is depicted in Fig. 6. We can see that
STRIP-ViTA is effective to detect different size triggers with
a lower FRR, e.g., 5%. We can also observe that: stronger
7There are five advanced backdoor attacks identified in [16]. However, one
attack is outside of the threat model, detailed in Section 6.5 in [20]. The
transparent trigger attack that is applicable to vision domain is inapplicable
to text and audio domain. Therefore, we do not consider these two backdoor
variants here.
9Table VI
ATTACK SUCCESS RATE AND CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY OF TROJAN
ATTACKS ON SC WITH DIFFERENT TRIGGER LENGTH AND POSITIONS.
Dataset
+ Model
Trigger
Length
Trojaned model Origin clean model
classification rateClassification
rate1
Attack success
rate2
SC + 1D CNN 300ms(100-400ms) 85.84% 96.45% 86.43%
SC + 1D CNN 500ms(500-1000ms) 85.02% 95.27% 86.43%
SC + 1D CNN 700ms(300-1000ms) 85.18% 95.91% 86.43%
SC + 1D CNN 1000ms(0-1000ms) 86.63% 98.36% 86.43%
the attack, easier to be detected, which is the principle of
STRIP-ViTA by design. For example, triggers of size 300ms
and 1000ms exhibits higher attack success rate, therefore, in
overall, the FAR is lower for them in compare with triggers
of other sizes exhibiting lower attack success rate.
Figure 6. Audio task detection capability as a function of the trigger size
(time period). The FRR settings of 0.5%, 1%, 3% and 5% are illustrated,
respectively.
2) Text: We use CC dataset and LTSM in this evaluation.
Figure 7. Text task attack success rate and detection capability as a function
of the length of trigger words. Higher the attack success rate, easier to
be detected. The FRR settings of 0.5%, 1%, 3% and 5% are illustrated,
respectively.
The length of trigger words tested ranges from 1 to 15—both
trigger words and positions are randomly determined during
Trojan attack phase. Specifically, attack success rates are
69.86%, 98.09%, 97.44%, 98.94%, 97.91%, 97.87%, 99.07%,
98.20%, 99.74%, 99.94%, 98.10%, 99.75%, 99.78%, 99.62%
and 99.97% for triggers with length from 1 to 15. It is under
expectation that, overall, the attack success rate increases when
the trigger size increases—becomes more salient. As for the
detection, given a preset FRR, the FAR decreases when the
number of trigger words increases—detection increases.
Based on tested results, as shown in Fig. 7, we can see that
STRIP-ViTA always achieves low FAR as long as the attacker
wishes to maximise his/her attack success rate, by setting an
appropriate FRR, e.g., 5%. It is worth to highlight the fact
that a large fraction of Trojan inputs with entropy higher
than the detection threshold no longer preserve their Trojaning
effects 8 if the attacker intentionally weakens attack success
rate of the trojan model, e.g., even still higher as 98.36% that
is exemplified in IV-D3. In other words, trying to evading the
STRIP-ViTA detection by lowering the attack success rate, the
Trojaning attack strength as one main advantage is sacrificed.
B. Multiple Infected Labels with Separate Triggers (A2)
We consider a scenario where multiple triggers targeting
distinct labels are inserted into a single model [16].
1) Audio: For audio task, we insert two triggers targeting
two different labels. Specifically, trigger1 period is 500ms
and inserted between 0ms and 500ms, targeting class ’Zero’;
period of trigger2 is also 500ms but inserted between 500ms
and 1000ms, targeting class ‘One’. For each trigger, it is used
to poison 500 samples—total training samples is 11,360. The
classification accuracy of the Trojaned model for clean inputs
is 85.59%, similar to the clean model.
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Figure 8. (a) Attack success rate of different triggers targetting different
labels. (b) Audio task detection capability for different triggers, where the
FRR settings of 0.5%, 1%, 3% and 5% are illustrated, respectively.
The attack success rate and STRIP-ViTA detection perfor-
mance are detailed in Fig. 8 (a) and (b) respectively. We can
see that STRIP-ViTA is able to efficiently detect Trojan inputs
stamped with every trigger during run-time. To be precise, by
presetting the FRR to be 3%, the FAR of 3.65% and 2.45%
can be achieved given trigger1 and trigger2, respectively.
2) Text: For text task, we aggressively insert ten triggers—
recall there are ten classes in CC dataset: each to a different
label. Specifically, the ith trigger targets ith class label. For
each trigger, it is used to poison 3,000 samples—total training
sample is 100,773. The classification accuracy of Trojan model
for clean inputs is 64.35%, decreased in comparison with the
clean model with 78.90%, which suggests the attacker has to
be careful when carry out such multiple trigger multiple label
backdoor attack—the attacker needs to fine-tune attack setting.
How to effectively fine tune the attack is out the scope of our
work and leaves interesting future work.
From trigger 0 to 9, attack success rates are 99.22%,
99.48%, 99.36%, 99.99%, 98.79%, 96.53%, 100%, 97.15%,
8Noting the FAR in Fig. 7 does not exclude Trojaned inputs that lose
Trojaning effects.
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Figure 9. Text task (CC+LSTM) detection capability for ten different triggers
targeting ten different labels. The FRR settings of 0.5%, 1%, 3% and 5% are
illustrated, respectively.
98.86%, 99.99%, respectively. The detection capability for
each trigger is detailed in Fig. 9. It is noted that for e.g.,
trigger0, trigger1, the FAR is substantially high when the FRR
is set to be too small, e.g., 0.5% or 1%. We investigate the
entropy distribution in these cases. The reason is that there are
some anomaly clean input accidentally exhibiting extremely
low entropy, as shown in Fig. 109. Nonetheless, we can see
by using a slightly higher FRR, e.g., 5%, the FAR can always
be successfully suppressed to be lower than 3% for all triggers.
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Figure 10. Red circled region shows the anomaly entropy from clean inputs,
and explains the extremely high FAR for e.g., trigger0 and trigger1, in Fig.9.
C. Same Infected Label with Separate Triggers (A3)
This attack considers a scenario where multiple distinctive
triggers hijack the model to classify any input image stamped
with any one of these triggers to the same target label.
1) Audio: The Trojan attack settings are same to that in
Section V-B1 except that now two triggers target the same la-
bel ’Zero’. The attack success rate and STRIP-ViTA detection
performance are detailed in Fig. 11 (a) and (b) respectively. We
can see that STRIP-ViTA is able to efficiently detect Trojan
inputs stamped with any of these triggers during run-time.
Notably, we found that the FAR of trigger2 keeps almost
constant for all four FRR settings: 0.5%, 1%, 3%, 5%. The
reason here is that out of 2000 tested Trojan inputs, only 5
preserve their Trojan effects. Recall here the FAR has excluded
those Trojan inputs that cannot preserve their Trojan effects, as
shown in the last column of Table V. We investigated the raw
FAR when including those Trojan inputs lose their Trojaning
effect, it is 17.65%, 13.10%, 7.95%, 6.95% corresponding to
9Note that we use 2,000 samples for testing Trojan inputs in our exper-
iments. Increasing the testing samples to determine the detection boundary
can eliminate this issue as well since those clean inputs exhibiting extremely
low entropy are rare.
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Figure 11. (a) Attack success rate of different triggers targetting the same
label. (b) Audio task detection capability for different triggers, where the FRR
settings of 0.5%, 1%, 3% and 5% are illustrated, respectively.
the FRR setting of 0.5%, 1%, 3% and 5%, respectively. We
can see that for this trigger2, almost all of the Trojan inputs
eventually do not have Trojan effects—only 5 preserve their
Trojan effects always exhibiting higher entropy.
D. Text
The Trojan attack settings are same to that in Section V-B2
except that now all ten triggers target the same label—the 4th
label. The Trojaned model classification rate for clean inputs
is 64%, lower than the clean model. For trigger 0 to 9, attack
success rates are 99.45%, 99.98%, 100%, 99.21%, 99.82%,
99.87%, 99.45%, 99.83%, 99.88%, and 99.94%, respectively.
The detection capability for each trigger is detailed in
Fig. 12. We can see that when the FRR is set to be 3%, FAR
for each trigger is always less than 2% for any trigger.
Figure 12. Text task detection capability for ten different triggers targeting
the same label. The FRR settings of 0.5%, 1%, 3% and 5% are illustrated,
respectively.
Summery: To this end, we can conclude that our STRIP-ViTA
is efficiently against all the above advanced Trojan attacks. The
crucial reason is that STRIP-ViTA exploits the input-agnostic
Trojan characteristic—the main strength of such attack, while
it is independent on trigger shape, size or/and other settings.
In other words, as long as the trigger is input-agnostic and
a high attack success rate is desired—always the case for the
attacker, STRIP-ViTA will be effective regardless Trojan attack
variants.
VI. RELATED WORK AND COMPARISON
We present related work including both Trojan attacks and
the state-of-the-art countermeasures. We then compare STRIP-
ViTA with these related countermeasures.
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A. Trojan Attacks
In 2017, Gu et al. [7], [32] proposed Badnets, where
the attacker has access to the training data and can, thus,
manipulate the training data via stamping arbitrarily chosen
triggers—e.g., square-like trigger located at the corner of the
digit image of the MNIST data—and then change the class
labels. By training on those poisoned samples, a Trojaned
model can be easily obtained. On the MNIST dataset, Gu et
al. [7], [32] demonstrated an attack success rate of over 99%
without impacting model performance on benign inputs. In
addition, Trojan triggers to misdirect traffic sign classifications
have also been investigated in [7]. Chen et al. [5] from UC
Berkeley concurrently demonstrated such Trojan attacks by
poisoning the training dataset.
Liu et al. [14] eschewed the requirements of accessing
the training data. Instead, their attack is performed during
the model update phase, not model training phase. They first
carry out reverse engineer to synthesize the training data, then
improve the trigger generation process by delicately designing
triggers to maximize the activation of chosen internal neurons
in the neural network. This builds a stronger connection
between triggers and internal neurons, thus, requiring less
training samples to insert backdoors. A related work by Ji et
al. [6] inserted insidious malicious behaviour to a feature
extractor—pretrained model. If victim trains their model by
using the malicious feature extractor, their model will be
infected.
Bagdasaryan et al. [9] showed that federated learning is
fundamentally vulnerable to trojan attacks. Firstly, participants
are enormous, e.g., millions, it is impossible to guarantee that
none of them are malicious. Secondly, federated learning is
designed to have no access to the participant’s local data and
training process to ensure the privacy of the sensitive training
data; therefore, participants can use Trojaned data for training.
The authors demonstrate that with control over no more than
1% participants, an attacker is able to cause a global model to
be Trojaned and achieves a 100% accuracy on the Trojaned
input even when the attacker is only selected in a single round
of training—federated learning requires a number of rounds to
update the global model parameters.
B. Trojan Defences
Trojan defences can be generally classified into two cate-
gories. The first is to inspect the model to determine whether
the model itself is Trojaned or not—performed offline. The
second is to check the input during run-time when the model is
under deployment. If the Trojan input is detected, an rejection
can be applied and then an alert can be thrown to allow the
user to carefully inspect the input and potentially discover the
trigger and further carry out model fixing.
1) Offline Trojan Model Detection and Fix: Works in [33],
[34] suggested approaches to remove the Trojan behavior
without first checking whether the model is Trojaned or not.
Fine-tuning is used to remove potential Trojans by pruning
carefully chosen parameters of the DNN model [33]. However,
this method substantially degraded the model accuracy [16].
Approaches presented in [34] incurred high complexity and
computation costs.
In S&P 2019, Wang et al. [16] proposed the Neural Cleanse
method to detect whether a DNN model has been Trojaned or
not offline, where its accuracy was further improved in [12].
Neural Cleanse is based on the intuition that, given a Trojaned
model, it requires much smaller modifications to all input sam-
ples to misclassify them into the attacker targeted (infected)
label than any other uninfected labels. Therefore, their method
iterates through all labels of the model and determines if any
label requires a substantially smaller amount of modification
to achieve misclassifications. One advantage of this method
is that the trigger can be discovered and identified during
the Trojaned model detection process. Note that the reversed
trigger may not have same or even similar visualisation to
the original trigger. However, this method has two limitations.
Firstly, it could incur high computation costs proportionally
to the number of labels. Secondly, similar to SentiNet [10],
the method is with decreasing effectiveness with increasing
trigger size.
In CCS 2019, Liu et al. proposed Artificial Brain Stimu-
lation (ABS) [19] by scanning a DNN model to determine
whether it is Trojaned. Inspiring from the Electrical Brain
Stimulation (EBS) technique used to analyze the human brain
neurons, Liu et al. created their ABS to inspect individual
neuron activation difference for anomaly detection of Trojan.
Some advantages of ABS are that i) it is trigger size indepen-
dent, and ii) requires only one input per label to detect the
Trojan. iii) It can also detect Trojan attacks on feature space
rather besides pixel space. Nevertheless, the method appears
to only effective under certain critical assumptions, e.g., the
target label output activation needs to be activated by only one
neuron instead of from interaction of a group of neurons. In
addition, the scope is also limited to the attack of one single
trigger per label. If multiple triggers were aimed to attack the
same label, it would be out of ABS’s reach.
In IJCAI 2019, Chen et al. proposed DeepInspect [17]
to detect Trojan attack even without any access to training
data. The key idea of DeepInspect is to use a conditional
generative model to learn the probabilistic distribution of
potential triggers. This generative model will be used to
generate reversed triggers whose their perturbation level will
be statistically evaluated to build the Trojan anomaly detection.
DeepInspect is faster than Neural Cleanse to reverse triggers
in complex datasets. However, due to the strict assumption of
having no access to training data, the result of this DeepInspect
appears to be worse than other state-of-the-art methods in
some situations.
2) Run-time Trojan Input Detection: Chou et al. [10] ex-
ploited both the model interpretability and object detection
techniques, referred to as SentiNet, to firstly discover con-
tiguous regions of an input image important for determining
the classification result. This region is assumed having a
high chance of possessing a trojan trigger when it strongly
affects the classification. Once this region is determined, it
is carved out and patched on to other held-out images that
are with ground-truth labels. If both the misclassification
rate—probability of the predicted label is not the ground-truth
12
label of the held-out image—and confidence of these patched
images are high enough, this carved patch is regarded as an
adversarial patch that contains a Trojan trigger. Therefore, the
incoming input is a Trojaned input.
In NDSS 2019, Ma et al. proposed NIC [18] by checking the
provenance channel and activation value distribution channel.
They extract DNN invariants and use them to perform run-time
adversarial sample detection including trojan input detection.
This method can be generally viewed to check the activation
distribution and flow across DNN layers—inspired by the
control flow used in programming—to determine whether the
flow is violated due to the adversarial samples. However,
NIC indeed requires extensive offline training to gain different
classifiers across layers to check the activation distribution and
flow and can be easily evaded by adaptive attacks [18].
Doan et al. proposed Februus [13] to detect and sanitize the
Trojaned input at run-time before it was fed into a Trojaned
classifier. They utilized a Visual Explanation tool to detect the
trigger region before surgically removing it. To maintain the
performance of the network, a GAN-based image inpainting
method has been deployed to restore the likeliness of the
Trojan images before it was Trojaned. This method can be
attached in front of any deep neural networks acting as a
Trojan filter to eliminate the Trojan effect on the network.
C. Comparison
To this end, we compare STRIP-ViTA with other four
recently published state-of-the-art defence works including
Neural Cleanse [16], DeepInspect [17], NIC [18], ABS [19],
as summarised in Table VII. All of these works adopt the same
assumption; having no access to Trojaned samples. There is
a scenario where a defender can have access to the Trojaned
samples [35], [36] but we consider a common and weaker
detection assumption same as Neural Cleanse, DeepInspect,
NIC, and ABS.
1) Across Domains: The STRIP-ViTA is the only detection
that is validated across vision, text, and audio domains. All
other detection methods are only validated on vision tasks,
whether they are applicable to other domains remains unclear.
Furthermore, we have also demonstrated that the STRIP-ViTA
is independent on model architectures, e.g., i) LTSM and
1D CNN (Section IV-C4), and ii) 1D CNN and 2D CNN
(Section IV-D4), even for the same task by using the same
dataset. While validations of all other countermeasures have
been limited with 2D CNN for vision tasks.
2) Trojan Variants: We have validated STRIP-ViTA ef-
ficiency against identified advanced backdoor attacks [16]
across all three domain tasks. Again, please kindly note that
for all other works, they only evaluate their approaches against
advanced backdoor variants based on vision tasks.
Under vision task, only ABS and STRIP-ViTA are inde-
pendent to trigger size (A1). Although Deepinspect is less
sensitive to larger size triggers—the maximum trigger size
reported [17] is 25% of the image input—in comparison to
Neural Cleanse, it still appears not effective for larger size
triggers. For A2 and A3, Neural Cleanse can only be effective
on the condition that the number of infected labels, or the
number of inserted triggers is small.
3) Reference Model: Both Neural Cleanse and ABS require
a ground-truth/golden reference model to determine the global
detection boundary for distinguishing Trojaned model from
clean model. Such global detection boundary might not be
applicable to all Trojaned models in few cases. Probably, one
not obvious fact is that users need to train Trojaned/clean
models by themselves to find out this global setting relying
on reference models. STRIP-ViTA does not need reference
model but solely the already deployed (Trojaned/clean) model
to determine the detection boundary that is unique to each
deployed model. In addition, ground-truth reference model
may partially violate the motivation for outsourcing the ML
model training to third party—the main source of attackers
to carry out backdoor attacks: if the users own training skills
and the computational power, it may be reasonable to train the
model, from scratch even without using pre-trained model—
the other source of backdoor attack, by themselves.
Not obviously, one advantage of STRIP-ViTA is that it
requires neither professional machine learning skills nor com-
putational power to employ it—solely straightforward and
simple entropy estimation. All other works either require
training ground-truth reference model [16], [19] or other
classifiers [17], [18]. Again, if the user has such skills and
computational resources, they may not opt for outsourcing to
train their models that is one of the main source of Trojan
attacks.
4) Time Overhead: As different settings for different Trojan
detection techniques (offline detection require no strict time
for inspecting the model, though it is desirable to be faster),
it is hard to fairly compare time overhead among them.
For example, Neural Cleanse may take days, e.g., 17 days,
depending on the model architecture and dataset. Here we opt
for reporting time overhead of our STRIP-ViTA solely as a
reference.
For all above experimental tests, we set N = 100 for
consistence, however, this may not be the optimal number
given the model architecture and dataset. Recall N is the
number of perturbing patterns applied to one given input. In
practice, smaller N , faster STRIP-ViTA run-time overhead. To
determine an optimal N , we have developed a method in [20].
In general, we observe the standard variation of entropy
distribution of clean inputs as a function of N . We pick up the
smallest N where the standard variation starts not change too
much (details are referred to Section 5.4 in [20]). Based on the
determined N , we have evaluated the STRIP-ViTA run-time
overhead [20] through traffic recognition task (GTSRB) using
ResNet20 for vision task, it takes 1.32 times longer—without
optimisation—than the original inference time.
Similarly, for text tasks, we have accordingly determined
N = 20 for IMDB+LSTM and N = 20 for CC+LTSM,
respectively. For IMDB, the default inference time for an input
is 11.77 ms, while the STRIP-ViTA takes 49.33 ms. Thus, it
is 4.24 times longer. For CC, the default inference time for
an input is 83.56 ms, while the STRIP-ViTA takes 117.8ms,
which is about 1.41 times longer.
For audio tasks, we have determined N = 10 for SC+1D
CNN. The default inference time for an audio input is 1.58 ms,
while the STRIP-ViTA takes 2.56 ms, which is about 1.62
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Table VII
COMPARISON WITH OTHER TROJAN DETECTION WORKS.
Work Black/White-Box Access
No Ground-Truth
Reference Model
Required
Run-time
Offline
No Trojaned
Samples Required
Vision
(FRR, FAR)
Text
(FRR, FAR)
Audio
(FRR, FAR) A1
2 A22 A32
Neural Cleanse [16]
(S&P 2019) Black-box 7 Offline 4 (1.63%, 5%) N/A
3 N/A 7 37 37
DeepInspect [17]
(IJCAI 2019) Black-box 4 Offline 4 (0%,0%)
4 N/A N/A 7 N/A N/A
NIC [18]
(NDSS 2019) White-box 4 Run-time 4 (3.4%,0%)
1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
ABS [17]
(CCS 2019) White-box 7 Offline 4 (N/A,1%)
5 N/A N/A 4 7 7
STRIP-ViTA
(Our Work) Black-box 4 Run-time 4 (0.125%, 0%) (3%, 1.1%) (3%, 3.55%) 4 4 4
1 Result is from MNIST dataset. For ImageNet, to achieve 0% FAR, the FRR needs to be up to 15.9%.
2 A1 (Trigger Size Independence), A2 (Multiple Infected Labels with Separate Triggers), A3 (Same Infected Label with Separate Triggers).
3 N/A means that results are not available.
4 DeepInspect determines whether the model is Trojaned or not. In [17], in total, five different Trojaned models are evaluated.
5 The FAR is based on the average detection accuracy summerised in column 3 in Table 4 in [19]. The FRR report is not available.
times longer.
Therefore, STRIP-ViTA is even acceptable for real-time
applications (e.g., traffic recognition and speech recognition)
that also shows insensitivity to model complexity and dataset.
Please note for all the above reported time overhead of STRIP-
ViTA, no further dedicated optimisation has been applied.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have corroborated the first multi-domain
Trojan detection, STRIP-ViTA, that is applicable to not only
vision but also text and audio domain tasks. We have exten-
sively validated the effectiveness and performance of STRIP-
ViTA through various model architectures and datasets. In
addition, STRIP-ViTA exhibits high efficacy against a number
of advanced input-agnostic backdoor attack variants validated
across all three domains.
Although we have developed different perturbation methods
for each domain task, other specific and efficient perturbation
methods can be applicable and leave future works. In addition,
although out of the scope of threat assumption that the com-
mon Trojan attack is input-agnostic, it is imperative to develop
Trojan detection method that is efficient to detect class-specific
Trojan attacks, which appear to be an open challenge.
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